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IN THE SUPREME COURT Of THE STA'I ": UTAH 
THE STATE OF OTAr, t 
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gRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASil 
Defendant,, T i 11.1.1-, Mauier, was charged with Murdei 
' :• -. '" ht^iLv, d First, Degree Felony, -m vj.u±r h 
Lode Ann, fi 78-5-203 11978) . 
Deferwlnnf nM" „r. ii'LutJ oi Murder iii '• he Second D e g r e e , 
i 11 , [ i i ,i i Neld Noverat)ei; 12 throuq11 Novemb»• i > "« , >"J'''"•, 
t h e T h i r d D i s t r i c t Court in cinil n i ". . i l i .KL L ^ MJII L y
 f M a t e 
Utah, t h e Hon M -it-1, •. I I . . i i , ' r F i ^ h i e i , Jud j i . , p r e s i d i n g . Judqe 
Fj.";.Iil»j.i s e n t e n c e d d e f e n d a n t t u an i n d e t e r m i n a t e 'Him "I I i 
yt-jii; t o l i f e n* Lite lit ,i!, ,':f«i„Ti ii:...-
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The v i c t i m . Jdn» t Hannan. and •  • <<< ( f MAPI • , Jjhn 
M , 11ved t oqe tiie r f »•' < - J»-i' '«, i ' i, o t h e n engagement, i n 
Cv: :/-K Since Janet c<i/ne fron: a f a i ; , i y 
a d v a n t a g e d Dackground, het p a r e n t s p u r c:h .i i*„.f*, "I "..i,, n LJKL 
'L1,'!'! dominium ,in t.ti ih > I I z-i * •. i »| • . H I M "i "In in J a n e t r e n t e d from her 
P f'i' i e»'» * i w 11 e i e fib1 a n d de fendan t 11 v e 11 (T , 4 I fi"', , 
A few days p r i o r t o January "i i"^'' - Ju t endan t ' s 
f i i e n d, Mi k e B i c K I»i - i i « i be g a n d a a t £ d i i; ' I"1". 419 - 4 21* 
428). After beginning the affair, Janet decided to spend the 
night of January 30th at Bickley's; so she called her parents, 
who were visiting her at the condominium, so they would not worry 
(R. 422). With her father's encouragement, Janet also decided to 
break off her engagement with defendant (R. 423). That same day, 
Janet called defendant at work and told him not to come home 
because the relationship was over (R. 401, 423, 524). That 
evening defendant came to the apartment, talked with Janet (R. 
402, 518, 523), and apologized to Mr. Hannan for the problems the 
relationship was causing to their visit (R. 521, 524). Mr. 
Hannan did not think defendant appeared to have been affected by 
his conversation with Janet (R. 521). Later, however, defendant 
called a friend, Ed Gutierrez from St. Mark's Hospital and said 
he was contemplating suicide (R. 541, 542). Doctors prescribed 
Valium for defendant's anxiety (R. 535-536). Ed met defendant at 
the hospital and they returned to Ed's apartment where defendant 
spent the night and unsuccessfully attempted to contact Janet (R. 
543, 545, 546). Ed thought defendant was depressed and upset 
with himself because defendant's relationship with Janet had 
failed (R. 543). 
The next morning, defendant arrived at Janet's deserted 
condominium prior to 10:30 a.m. and was there waiting when Janet 
and Mike Bickley arrived (R. 402). Defendant asked if he could 
talk with Janet alone. After Janet consented, Mike went across 
the street for breakfast (R. 403) . At that time, defendant 
appeared calm and in control (R. 403). After about an hour Mike 
returned to find defendant and Janet still talking on the couch 
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( R , i * . MI,, i i i , i s k e d Mi'* * w • - ^ t 
w ne L her bik wai- i ( ; (jr c a b l e w i t h s u n ii i i, an gem en i ID UL iai" • 
s a i d *Ni, "', 1,,,-h i I i-ii • iJi't;' was going w i th him f k 4>> ^ . 
•T • , • -en w «;iiJ L. i n t o t h e bedroom t o r cmov»• r I1.*t e1idan i "  s 
c i o U i e u and i^n HI p i l i n g them near Mi" •. « w i\ Hf • 4 ik i Defendant 
began p a c m u oe tw?" .iwdroom, t h e k i t c h e n and t ^ I i« v»-• i i • 
IF i'I t^iCKiey n o t i c e d t h a t de fendan ' w cupboard 
and poured Himself a \ \i\ of c ' ''i». «ie d in not n o t i c e 
«" de fendan t M ' I H M l . h i r t e e n inch o u t c h e r k n i f r I . ^ / I , ll ,te 
i-t"'f-'- ii*:'1' .. ' b e f o r e he q u i e t I v •- ••• the bedroom 
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- j ,'u"!( L & oack was t u r n e d away from turn ilH f.-m I».I 111 
;,• i1 ' he Knife i n t o her back between '> '«"' " , i-'iui M a d e .jrui 
t h e s p i n e r i n t o her he 'n i , r,«if; i •„ i/kj t n t niaioi" a r t e r y from tin-
h e a r t ll1 I in hm.i1. M-'1 4311, uf,,.f) Hike h e a r d J a n e t ' s • » 
wt-uL Lo t h e bedroom t o see J a n e t w,"»i» ii«, i i u the ha l lway w i t h 
t h e K111 f t" s t i c k \ n >: \ , '" „ •, ; R . 406) a n ;i d e f e n * * n r r . 
• Jan*-M ' riitii;«;, yuu ..jn,, ik)w d id you lih!? in it i 
1
 i ' ' compla ined she cou'i M.,it.'» us sue waiKed 
t h e t a b l e where sti' . ,\ *• : -i.-1 
Mike i dsiit-u t o t he phone t o c.il , l| ., -1 
But as Mike p i c k e d u\\ th*1 pnr'fn • ,- . . . u d i a l , d e f e n d a n t 
qraobed Mik€j f - ,. i • . b iuke t h e a n t e n n a fron- n i - . I«*»I i 
M» /.-ll/ d i s a b J i n y i* i>, ..,*>>• Mik 'i/4,i s c r eaming 
1 ,.-. h^ : t **. 4Gk , 
Mik. uiul •**•"! endan t s t r u g g l e d u n t i l p a r a m e d i c s , ^"iiM^u'ied 
i,y .i in j j h b o i , a r r i v e d (R. 4 1 0 ) ; defendrml .ii I wiuptiny t-,- keej 
Mike from reaching help, and Mike attempting to keep defendant 
away from Janet (R. 409), who by now had collapsed on the floor 
(R. 441). As they fought, defendant repeated to Mike "I want you 
to hurt like I hurt," (R. 431-432). When the paramedics arrived 
defendant gave up his fight, sat down at the kitchen table and 
smiled strangely (R. 410). Defendant did not flee, nor did he 
deny Mike's screaming allegations that defendant stabbed Janet 
(R. 443-444, 446-447, 467). Instead he seemed relaxed and even 
smiled (R. 456, 459). Defendant seemed pleased with what was 
happening (R. 465), acted casual and wore a "smart alleck-type" 
grin (R. 471) . He looked as though he knew something everyone 
else did not know (R. 472). Later, he looked crazed, as though 
he had seen a ghost (R. 473). 
By the time the paramedics arrived Janet had no pulse 
(R. 450). They unsuccessfully attempted to revive her heart with 
electrical stimulus (R. 450-52). When the ambulance arrived and 
took Janet's body away, defendant's expression turned to a "cold 
mean-type stare" (R. 472). Later, defendant became very calm 
once again (R. 511). 
Six weeks after Janet's death, her father received a 
vengeful letter from defendant (R. 528) describing the incident 
and his feelings about committing the acts. In the letter, 
defendant said he was glad that he killed Janet and that it was 
great to watch her die. 
Dr. Alan Jeppsen, a psychiatrist who examined defendant 
in May, 1985, concluded that defendant suffered a great deal of 
anxiety and stress in January 1985 (R. 573, 574), and that he had 
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c o n s e q u e n c e s of h,ir' a.-i i i.n1.. L-LJI «\,>IJI«J t o r m u l a t e t h e i n t e n t 
k i l l I P "f i"(! |l" 11 j b l1 ., ." -he s a I d t h a t d e f e n d a n t ' s sm i 1 i n q a f: i *•* r 
J a n e t ' s d e a t h w a s m o i e 11 k e 1 y i n a p p r <"- p r i a * « , i i e •: t , i 
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an e kj'i" t-i"; <•; i iMi ul t u juyment of J a n e t ' s d e a t h IK . <^ '. M f.r."n . 
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Low levels of diazepam (valium) were found in 
defendants blood sample taken shortly after the murder (R. 656, 
661, 666). Diazepam can cause paradoxical effects, opposite to 
its intended effect, in the ingester (R. 661-663), although this 
is an uncommon reaction occurring in a small percentage of 
individuals who ingest toxic amounts of the drug (R. 662, 776). 
Dr. Lincoln Clark testified that valium is a very 
slowly absorbed and metabolized drug (R. 680). The amount of 
metabolate contained in defendants blood sample indicated a 
fairly recent ingestion of the drug (R. 681). Defendant's blood 
contained only one-half of the effective level of valium when the 
sample was drawn at 1:30, approximately 3 hours after he stabbed 
Janet Hannan (R. 656, 687). Dr. Clark explained the he knew of 
no paradoxical reactions being reported from diazepam (valium) at 
therapeutic levels (R. 688, 776), although a sufficient dose of 
valium would relax inhibitions (R. 689). There is no evidence, 
however, that such an effect would lead a person to do something 
he did not want to do (R. 690). Dr. Clark opined that the 
evidence of what defendant did and the psychological testing 
indicated a reaction to very basic human emotions in a crisis 
situation; anger, jealousy and revenge (R. 773-774). Dr. Clark 
thought it was significant that no psychotic symptoms were 
reported by the physician who treated defendant for anxiety the 
day before the murder (R. 771). 
Despite defendant's arguments that he suffered from 
extreme emotional disturbance at the time of the homicide, the 
jury convicted him of second-degree murder rather than 
manslaughter. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I. The letter written by defendant to the 
victim's father after her death expressing his mental state at 
the time of the homicide was admissible as non-hearsay and highly 
relevant to the major issue at trial; defendant's mental state. 
The letter was not unfairly prejudicial and its probative value 
far exceeded any possible prejudicial effect. Its admission at 
trial, therefore, was proper. 
POINT II. The trial judge did not unduly limit voir 
dire of the potential jurors. In fact, the judge would have 
allowed some of the questions defendant wished to ask. The other 
questions went into irrelevant or private matters and defendant 
did not offer any less intrusive questions on these subjects. In 
light of the questions that were asked, the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in not asking the questions complained of on 
appeal. 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED A LETTER 
WRITTEN BY THE DEFENDANT TO THE FATHER OF 
THE VICTIM. 
Ruling on defendant's motion to suppress documentary 
evidence, the trial court found defendant's letter written to the 
father of the victim admissible, relevant and probative beyond 
any prejudicial effect. Specifically, the trial court determined 
that the letter constituted an admission against interest and was 
therefore admissible as non-hearsay under Utah R. Evid. 801(d)(2) 
(R. 110) . The court found that the statements were sufficiently 
probative to help the jury "in their determination [of the 
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defendant's! state of mind • • . at the time of the killing" (R. 
110); and that "the probative value • • . substantially 
outweigh led! the danger of prejudice" (R. 111). 
The trial court affirmed its pretrial ruling following 
a rehearing granted minutes before trial. Recognizing that the 
letter may go to the state of mind of defendant on March 10, 1985 
(the day the letter was written) the court found that it also 
reflected the state of mind of the defendant on the 31st day of 
January, 1985 (the day of the incident) (R. 371). After 
reaffirming the relevance of the letter to the issue of fact 
regarding the defendant's state of mind at the time of the 
killing, the court again reaffirmed its prior finding that the 
letter's probative value outweighed any danger of unfair 
prejudice (R. 371). In making its final ruling, the court 
indicated that in criminal cases the defendant's specific intent 
is generally determined by circumstantial evidence. Since 
defendant's mental state was the only issue of fact to be 
determined at trial, the court recognized the central importance 
of this piece of evidence. Among other things, the letter 
directly and inferentially reveals the defendant's recollection 
of his role in the homicide and his mental state at the time he 
killed the victim. 
On appeal, defendant makes two claims. He argues first 
that the letter was irrelevant to the issues at trial and second 
that, even if the letter was relevant, its prejudicial effect 
outweighed its probative value. As argued below, the letter was 
highly relevant to defendant's mental state at the time of the 
murder and was not unfairly prejudicial. 
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Defendant contends that the trial court abused its 
discretion under Utah R. Evid. 401 and 402 by admitting 
defendant's written statements recalling his own account of the 
homicide. More specifically, defendant argues that the evidence 
was irrelevant in establishing his "state of mind at the time he 
committed the crime," (Appellant's Brief at 10). 
Defendant cites the Idaho Supreme Court's finding in 
State v. Marlar, 498 P.2d 1276, 94 Idaho 803 (1972) that threats 
of future harm relating to a possible event in the future do not 
relate to defendant's mental state at the time of a prior 
incident. However, threats of future harm are easily 
distinguished from the statements made in this case. Defendant's 
letter to the victim's father neither threaten him nor relate to 
a possible future event. Rather, they recount and describe 
defendant's own mental state during the commission of the crime 
charged. As such, even the Marlar court would find defendant's 
letter admissible. 498 P.2d at 1282. 
Defendant also cites State v. Sempsrottt 587 S.W.2d 630 
(Mo. App. 1979). The similarities between this case and the one 
at hand end with both defendants writing letters to their 
victim's relatives. Sempsrott's letter was hearsay, defendant's 
letter was not. Sempsrott's letter was inadmissible because it 
contained self-serving statements of remorse and because the 
seven month lapse between the incident and the letter, removed 
the letter from consideration as a spontaneous utterance and an 
exception to the hearsay rule. The court stated: "In order for 
defendant's statements in the letter to be part of the res gestae 
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they must be the apparently spontaneous result of the occurrence 
operating upon his perceptive senses. (Citation omitted) 
Declarations that are the product of reasoning from collateral 
facts are not part of the res gestae." 587 S.W.2d at 634. 
In this case, defendant's letter contained incriminat-
ing rather than self-serving statements and is therefore not 
hearsay at all. The letter was a statement against interest and, 
as such, was admissible as non-hearsay under Utah R. Ev. 
801(d)(2). £ee also Watters v. Querrv, 588 P.2d 702 (Utah 1978) 
(Motorist's statement to friend that she "felt like she was the 
cause" of the accident held an admission against interest; non-
hearsay under former Rule 63(7)); United States v. Matlock, 415 
U.S. 164, 172 (1974) (party opponent's declaration admissible for 
any inference which can reasonably be drawn regarding issues at 
trial). 
Moreover, defendant here admits that the letter was 
admissible as non-hearsay but claims that it was unreliable. In 
further support of his claim of unreliability, defendant cites 
People v. Northrop, 182 Cal. Rptr. 197, 132 Cal. App.3d 1027 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1982) in which the court barred Northrop's self-
serving hearsay statements made three to six months before her 
child's death. These statements that Northrop's husband slapped 
her and that she feared taking her child back to live with him 
bore only slight relevancy to the issue of Northrop's state of 
mind and were too remote in time to be sufficiently probative. 
The California Court's decision to bar untrustworthy self-serving 
hearsay is contrasted by the trustworthiness of voluntary 
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statements against interest such as defendant's. The notes of 
the advisory committee on Federal Rule 801(d)(2), 28 U.S.C. p. 
7179 states: 
Admissions by a party-opponent are excluded 
from the category of hearsay on the theory 
that their admissibility in evidence is the 
result of the adversary system rather than 
the satisfaction of the hearsay rule 
[Citations omitted]. No guarantee of trust-
worthiness is required in the case of an 
admission. The freedom which admissions have 
enjoyed from technical demands of searching 
for an assurance of trustworthiness in some 
against-interest circumstances, and from 
restrictive influences of the opinion rule 
and the rule requiring first-hand knowledge, 
when taken with the apparently prevalent 
satisfaction with the results, calls for a 
generous treatment of this avenue of 
admissibility. [Emphasis supplied.] 
See also United States v. Pinalto, 771 F.2d 457, 459 (10th Cir. 
1985). As that court noted, it would be error to "erroneously 
view trustworthiness as a separate requirement of admission under 
Section 801(d)(2) (A)". Id. 
Had the trial court suppressed the evidence as 
unreliable, as defendant now suggests it should have, the court 
would have invaded the province of the jury. The determination 
of credibility of evidence has always been exclusively reserved 
for the trier of fact, See Pinalto, 771 F.2d at 459, and 
statements against interest carry their own indicia of 
reliability. Matlock, 415 U.S. at 176. 
Defendants contention that the letter was inadmissible 
is based in part on the notion that the letter addresses 
defendant's mental state at the time the letter was written. 
Defendant goes to great lengths to establish something the state 
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has never disputed. Defendant asserts that the letter 
•illustrated Mr, Maurerfs 'malevolent attitude1 toward the 
victim's father when he wrote the letter" (D.B. 10). The State 
contends that while the letter may reveal the defendant's state 
of mind at the time the letter was written it also reveals the 
defendant's state of mind at the time he killed the victim. 
Consequently, the letter is relevant evidence that advances the 
inquiry. The letter is evidence from which possible conclusions 
as to defendant's mental state could be drawn by the jury. The 
letter gave the jury a rare opportunity to see with their own 
eyes evidence which corroborated or discredited witness testimony 
on a defendant's state of mind. Since the Utah Rules define 
"relevant evidence" as evidence with "any tendency to make the 
existence of any [material] fact . . . more or less probable," 
Utah R. Evid. 401 (emphasis added), the letter is quint-
essentially relevant. The letter permits the jury to see, first 
hand, evidence from defendant's own hand on his state of mind; 
the major issue in the trial of this case. 
In the present case, the central issue to be determined 
by the jury was the defendant's state of mind on January 31, 
1985. The judge correctly decided the letter's probativeness. 
For example, the letter stated, "I'm glad I killed Janet . . . It 
was a great feeling to watch her die." While defendant's 
contention is that the letter reflects defendant's mental process 
at the time the letter was written, the trial judge was within 
his discretion to determine such statements constituted 
defendant's recollection of his own mental state at the time he 
killed Janet Hannan. 
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Case lav establishes the proper admission into evidence 
of subsequent conduct and statements with respect to a criminal 
offense with which the defendant is charged, if the subsequent 
behavior and statements reflect probatively upon the elements of 
the crime. Moreover, such evidence is admissible within the 
sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Abu-Isba, 685 P.2d 
856, 863 (Kan. 1984); Harrell v. United States, 220 F.2d 516, 519 
(5th Cir. 1955). See also, Am. Jur. 2d, Evidence S366; 22A 
C.J.S., Criminal Law §623; 1 Wharton's Criminal Evidence §209 
(13th ed. 1972); Moorman v. United States. 389 F.2d 27, 30 (6th 
Cir. 1968); United States v. Stoehr, 196 F.2d 276, 282 (3d. Cir. 
1952). 
Finally, although defendant is correct in asserting 
that defendant's letter does not fall within any of the res 
gestae exceptions to the hearsay rule as outlined in State v. 
Newman, 513 P.2d 258, 262 (Mont. 1973), defendant's letter does 
not need to fall within an exception to the hearsay rule to be 
admissible. The letter is non-hearsay. The statements in Newman 
were found inadmissible hearsay on the same grounds this Court 
found inadmissible the hearsay statements made by the victim of 
her fear of the defendant in State v. Wauneka, 560 P.2d 1377 
(Utah 1977). Rather than constituting a defendant's own 
statements against interest, as in the case at hand, the 
inadmissible statements in Wauneka and Newman were statements 
made by the victims that they feared the defendant and were 
hearsay falling outside an exception to the hearsay rule. 
Moreover, since the defendants* wifes' state of mind had nothing 
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to do with the issue at trial (the defendants1 mental state) the 
statements constituted a relationship too tenuous to the issues 
of the case to be admissible, id. at 1381. 
Defendant next claims that the letter, even if relevant 
and admissible on other grounds, was unfairly prejudicial and 
should have been suppressed. "The responsibility of weighing 
relevance against prejudice is that of the trial judge, and his 
discretion will not be overturned by this Court unless it is 
shown to be an abuse of discretion." State v. Garcia, 663 P.2d 
60, 64 (Utah 1983); £ee also. State v. Johns, 615 P.2d 1260, 1264 
(Utah 1980); State v. McClain, 706 P.2d 603, 605 (Utah 1985); 
Utah R. Ev. 403.* Indeed the advisory committee notes to Fed. 
R. Evid. 403, which Utah has adopted almost verbatim, call for 
balancing the probative value of the need for the particular 
evidence against the harm likely to result from its admission. 
The appellate courtfs power of review is 
relatively limited. The test it is forced to 
apply* since it was not present at trial, 
will normally require it to assure the 
maximum probative force a reasonable jury 
might assess and the minimum prejudice to be 
reasonably expected. 
See also, Relevancy and Its Limits, 1 Weinstein's Evid. (MB) K 
401 1011 (1985); Texas Eastern Transmission v. Main Office Etc., 
579 F.2d 561 (10th Cir. 1978); F & S Offshore, Inc. v. K.O. Steel 
* Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence states: 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded 
if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, or misleading the 
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, 
waste of time or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence. 
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Castings Inc., 662 P.2d 1104, 1101-08 (5th Cir. 1981). Relevant 
evidence is inherently prejudicial, however, only unfair 
prejudice that substantially outweighs probative value dictates 
exclusion of relevant matter under Rule 403. United States v. 
McRae, 593 F.2d 700 (5th Cir. 1979), reh. den. 597 F.2d 283, 
cert. den. 444 U.S. 862. 
The State has already established above that the letter 
was highly relevant and probative. The State must prove 
defendant's mental state beyond a reasonable doubt. Without the 
letter, the jury could only infer defendant's mental state from 
his acts. Furthermore, defendant was not helpless to combat the 
evidence. He presented psychological testimony on his own 
interpretation of the letter's import. 
The defendant cites State v. Cloud, 722 P.2d 750 (Utah 
1986) as articulating a new and controlling standard that all 
evidence which advances the State's position must pass. 
Specifically, the defendant asserts that evidence concerning 
defendant's mental state at the time of the murder was cumulative 
and available through other means besides the letter. Thereforer 
defendant contends that the letter lacked "essential evidentiary 
value." (D.B. 14-15). 
Although Cloud may advance a higher standard with 
regard to gruesome photographs introduced with the intent to 
inflame the jury, this court has never advanced this standard 
beyond such photographs. This standard certainly does not apply 
to the case at hand. This standard was not extended to the 403 
balancing test recently articulated in State v. Pierce, 722 P.2d 
780 (Utah 1986). 
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In Pierce this Court determined that there was no error 
when the trial court allowed into evidence testimony that 
defendant bought a stolen air compressor in exchange for 
marijuana valued at $100. By so doing this court reaffirmed a 
long line of Utah cases holding that evidence of another wrong-
doing by the defendant cannot be introduced into evidence to 
prove defendants bad character or defendant's propensity to 
commit crime, but it can be admissible when it shows intent, 
knowledge, identity or other circumstances surrounding the 
offense. Id. at 782. £>ee also State v. McCardell, 652 P.2d 942 
(Utah 1982); State v. Daniels, 584 P.2d 880 (Utah 1978); State v. 
Gibson, 565 P.2d 783 (Utah 1977); State v. Baran, 25 Utah 2d 27, 
474 P.2d 728 (1970), similarly decided under former Utah R. Evid. 
45(D) and 55. Therefore, although the letter clearly could not 
be introduced to show defendant's bad character or defendant's 
propensity to commit crime or his attitude of vengefulness toward 
Janet's father, the letter could be introduced to show 
defendant's mental state at the time of the murder. 
Defendant relies on State v. Miller, 709 P.2d 350 (Utah 
1985) and Pearce v. Wistisen, 701 P.2d 489 (Utah 1985) as 
precedent for a Rule 403 exclusion of testimony which focuses on 
defendant's character rather than an element of the crime or 
other relevant issue. Rule 403 excludes such evidence because it 
shifts the focus of the inquiry in a manner which would confuse 
the jury or cause the jury to base its judgment upon an improper 
ground. However, in the instant case, the letter is not 
character evidence. It is defendant's own recollection of how he 
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felt at the time of the murder. Although defendant's 
recollection of his own participation in and his own mental state 
during the killing may reflect poorly on his character, it does 
not transform the letter into "character evidence." It remains 
prima facie evidence advancing an essential element required by 
the state to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The fact that 
the letter may reflect poorly upon defendant's character did not 
"unfairly" prejudice the defendant and was a matter within the 
trial judge's discretion. 
So long as the evidence is relevant and advances the 
inquiry by addressing the factual issues before the jury the mere 
fact that such evidence gives the jury the opportunity to see 
with its own eyes evidence which corroborates or discredits 
witness testimony does not make otherwise relevant evidence 
inadmissible. Outside of the exception created in Cloud for 
gruesome photographs, the cumulative nature of this type of 
evidence remains indeterminate. See State v. Garcia, 663 P.2d 
60, 63 (Utah 1983); State v. Ross, 28 Utah 2d 279, 283-84, 501 
P.2d 632, 635-36 (1972); State v. Gee, 28 Utah 2d 96, 100, 498 
P.2d 662, 664-65 (1972); State v. Poe, 24 Utah 2d 355, 359, 471 
P.2d 870, 872 (1970); State v. Jackson. 22 Utah 2d 408, 454 P.2d 
290 (1969), similarly decided under Utah R. Evid. 45(b) and 55. 
The key consideration has been the relevance of the evidence, 
Garcia, 663 P.2d at 63. 
Defendant also attempts to reduce the relevance of the 
letter by pointing out that he was willing to stipulate that he 
3tabbed Janet Hannan. The letter, however, was not offered to 
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prove who killed Ms. Bannan but was offered as direct evidence of 
defendant's mental state at the time he stabbed her* Even so, 
the letter was also admissible to corroborate the State's 
evidence that defendant committed the crime. While an offer to 
stipulate to evidence should be considered in the 403 balancing 
process, the State was by no means required to accept the 
stipulation. United States v. Grassi, 602 F.2d 1192, 1196 (5th 
Cir. 1979). Attempts to remove materiality by admitting or 
stipulating to facts to be proved at trial are not always 
successful. See e.g., United States v. Brady, 595 F.2d 359 (6th 
Cir. 1979), cert. den. 444 U.S. 862 (stipulation that victims 
died by gunshot wound did not eliminate materiality of photos of 
victims lying in pools of blood in bank). Courts have determined 
that a piece of evidence can have probative value even when a 
defendant offers to stipulate to the ultimate issue on which 
evidence is offered. See United States v. Grassi, 602 F.2d 1192, 
1197 (5th Cir. 1979), reh. den. 606 F.2d 321 (5th Cir. 1979). A 
stipulation does not provide the jury with a basis for evaluating 
probative force of any details omitted from it. See e.g., United 
States v. Bowers, 660 F.2d 527, 530 (5th Cir. 1981) (in 
prosecution for child abuse, no error in admitting color 
photograph of child's injuries depicting use of cruel and 
excessive force, notwithstanding defendant's offer to stipulate 
to cause of child's death). United States v. Peltier, 585 F.2d 
314, 324-25 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. den. 440 U.S. 945 (1979) (no 
error to reject defendant's offer to stipulate to fact of flight 
where government would thus have been robbed of the probative 
details of that flight). 
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In the case at hand, the letter remains material 
because it advances the inquiry into defendants mental state. 
This was the crucial issue. An offer to stipulate to the fact 
that defendant intentionally killed the victim would have removed 
more than evidence concerning who killed the victim. It would 
have removed from the jury's consideration the probative value 
the letter provided about the mental state of defendant at the 
time of the murder. Since the letter constituted defendant's own 
account of the murder, the defendant's mental state could not 
have been conveyed to the jury as accurately by alternative means 
and admission of the letter was proper. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT HAS NOT SHOWN THAT THE TRIAL JUDGE 
ABUSED HIS DISCRETION BY LIMITING VOIR DIRE 
OF POTENTIAL JURORS. 
Defendant complains that he was not allowed to question 
potential jurors in four areas: Whether they thought 
psychiatrists or psychologists have valuable insights into human 
behavior; whether they would be likely to disregard the testimony 
of such experts; whether they had experienced stressful or 
volatile emotional relationships; and whether they had strong 
feelings against the use of alcohol. While defendant alleges 
that the failure to ask these questions fatally flawed the jury 
selection process, the voir dire was adequate for assessment of 
potential bias and the intelligent exercise of peremptory 
challenges. 
As defendant states in his brief, the trial judge has 
broad discretion to limit the scope of voir dire to relevant 
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matters* State v. Ball, 685 P.2d 1055 (Utah 1984). The judge 
can preclude questions which are "used to educate the jury to the 
particular facts of the case, to compel the jurors to commit 
themselves to vote a particular way, to prejudice the jury for or 
against a particular party, to argue the case, to indoctrinate 
the jury, or to instruct the jury in matters of law." (Citations 
omitted) People v. Williams. 29 Cal.2d 392, 174 Cal. Rptr. 317, 
628 P.2d 869, 877 (1981). The judge is also allowed to limit 
questioning in order to be time efficient as long as those 
limitations do not affect the quality of justice. People v. 
Blount, 479 F.2d 650, 652 (6th Cir. 1973). 
From the record, one cannot discern Judge Fishier*s 
reasons for excluding all of the questions complained about. 
Nevertheless, the Judge did state that although he would not ask 
the jurors whether they had personally sought psychiatric or 
psychological counseling, he did ask whether anyone had studied 
these fields and would have allowed further questioning on 
whether these people were biased toward mental health experts (R. 
376). Judge Fishier indicated that questioning whether a person 
had ever sought mental health treatment was an unwarranted 
invasion of privacy (R. 376) and defendant did not strenuously 
object to this aspect of the courtfs apparent limitations. 
Judge Fishier made no comments, however, when defendant 
objected, for the record, to the courtfs failure to ask the other 
questions about emotional relationships and use of alcohol. The 
latter of these seems to have been of little relevance since the 
use of alcohol by defendant was not an important issue at trial. 
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Defendant elicited testimony that he was a reformed alcoholic but 
there was no evidence that he ingested alcohol or was under its 
influence or that previous alcohol abuse affected his mental 
state at the time of the crime. Since this question went to an 
irrelevant issue, the trial court was well within its discretion 
to refuse defendant's proffered voir dire question. 
On the other hand, a portion of defendant's questions 
aoout stressful or volatile emotional relationships, found on 
page 10 of Addendum B of Appellant's Brief, essentially restate 
the court's general questioning whether jurors or their relatives 
had been victims of crime (R. 346) . ("Have you ever witnessed 
others driven to violence as a result of [a relationship with a 
loved one]?). The further questions whether they had ever 
comforted anyone whose partner had left them or if they had taken 
sedatives to calm their emotions also seem invasive of the 
juror's privacy and not particularly enlightening on their 
ability to sit as fair and impartial jurors. This is especially 
true in light of the wide variety of other areas upon which the 
jurors were questioned. This Court specifically recognized in 
State v. Ball, 583 P.2d at 1058 that "the gathering of sufficient 
relevant information must, of course, be pursued with a 
sensitivity to the privacy of the potential juror." While there 
may have been less intrusive ways to reach the potential biases 
defendant felt he must explore, defendant did not offer any less 
intrusive questions on the subject he sought to explore. 
On appeal, defendant has not established any prejudice 
arising from the allegedly inadequate voir dire. Under State v. 
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Malmrose, 649 P.2d 56r 60 (Utah 1982), defendant must establish 
the existence of such prejudice or the trial courtfs ruling 
should be sustained. In light of the possibility of constructing 
questions that would have been appropriate on the issues 
defendant complains of, defendant has failed to demonstrate that 
he was prejudiced by the failure to ask the specific questions 
offered. 
CONCLUSION 
The State requests this Court to affirm defendant's 
conviction and deny his request for a new trial. 
DATED this ////) day of March, 1987. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
/ /SANDRA L. SJOGREN 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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